Thursday, April 23, 2020

WTO TRIPS Essay Example

WTO TRIPS Essay The WTO TRIPS traces its origins from the 1994 General Agreement on Trade Tariffs (GATT) Uruguay Rounds which proposed its existence. The TRIPS in essence spells out the standards for divers   forms of regulations that touch on the intellectual property rights. To this effect, it divulges on standards each nation must meet to enforce the copyright laws, patenting, trade marks, the protection of confidential information, and the geographical indications. After the narrowness and the limitations that were found in the TRIPS, DOHA was then proposed.  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   The DOHA is a multilateral commercial system that has been enshrined in the World Trade Organization(WTO) and seeks to make enhancements on economic growth, expansion and establishment. Having existed over fifty years, this multilateral trading system aims at working towards the entrenchment of international trade by ensuring   a system that promotes the liberalisation of trade and international trade policies that catalyse the recovery of the economy, its growth and development. It is on this backdrop that the DOHA multilateral commercial system is against protectionism in international trade, following the objections that were created in the World Trade Agreement, the Marrakesh Agreement (Yeaman, 2003 pp. 39).Recent developments in the DOHA and TRPS meetings and their impacts on the LDCs agriculture and   industries.The latest DOHA development and TRIPS Agreement national workshop meeting was held on 22nd February, 2007 in Indonesia, under the aegis of the WTO which was in liaison with the ministry of foreign affairs (Oberg, 2002 pp. 214).In the meeting, there were pressure from the developed econ omies on the developing countries to fulfill their obligations spelt out in the TRIPS Agreement Article 66.2. This demanded that the Least Developing Countries (LDCs) facilitate and carry out technology transfer so as to introduce and maintain an efficient technological base that will make international trade feasible. The LDCs were censured for only submitting reports that touch on technological training and capacity erections (Zhang, 2001 pp. 66). This is normally taken as a failure on the side of the developing economies, yet their financial base is too narrow to support   this undertaking. The main issue here is the time and the financial resources that are needed to realise the policy- and this is not being well considered by the developed counterparts (Tawfik, 2000 pp. 138).The fourth WTO conference was held in November 2001, in Qatar, to ensure that TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) member states are helped to interpret the TRIPS policies so as t o be able to take comprehensive measures on public health. Even in the WTO which is still a confederation of different states which have come together for the sake of trade, interests still thrive. The interests range from interstate competition to competition taking on the form of regional blocks pitted against each other (Plat, 2000 pp. 92). In this sense, regions and states will always seek to have policies that are favourable to them, entrenched by the WTO. For instance, Europe, the biggest global importer of agricultural and farm produce wants all forms of local support accorded to farmers plummeted. Europes main import zones include the developing economies and few developed countries such as the United States, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Australia. In the same wavelength, it wants all the export subsidies offered to the same farmers extirpated by 2013. On the other end, it is pushing for lower tariffs (Taylor, 2003 pp. 40).The European Union says that it is pushing for glo bal accessibility of all industrial goods in the international market. For this, it is aiming at pressuring the WTO to cut out high tariffs. From the facade, this seems a good idea, but it is, under close scrutiny, an artifice to strengthen Europe. Reduced subsidies will increase farming expenses for the farmers while at the other end, plummeted tariffs will only enable Europe to acquire agricultural and farm imports at a very affordable rate (Probs, 2002 pp. 155).From the days of the WTOs General Agreement on Trade Tariffs (GATT), there have been serious cases of structural imbalances and over protectionism in some trading regions, compared to the others. Therefore, Developing countries in the Uruguay Round expected that the heavily protected sectors (textiles and agriculture) would be made more accessible so as to make it possible for the LDC products to have sufficient international access. Howbeit, the two sectors remain locked being characterised by highly proscriptive tariffs with some striking and passing the 200%- 300% mark (Correa, 2004 pp. 244). This comes in the wake of the OECDs Domestic subsidies having soared from 275 American billion dollars to 326 billion. In the textiles and fabrics domain, very minimal items produced by the LDCs have been removed from the quota list even after ten years of corrective implementation period has elapsed. According to the Bureau of International Textiles, only thirteen out of seven hundred and fifty have been exempted from the quota list by the US, while Europe has only excised fourteen out of two hundred and nineteen, and Canada, twenty nine out of two hundred and ninety five. This made it obvious that most of the quotas will not have been eradicated by the arrival of the targeted period of 2013 (Thomas, 2005 pp. 39). At the turn of the century, the realisation towards this exercise was retrogressed by Americas announcement that she would in order to   protect her local steel industry, impose a 30% tariff on h er steel imports. This demonstrates clearly the fact that most developed nations in the WTO are not ready to forfeit their interests just to facilitate international trade (Rajan, 2005 pp. 139).Inspite of the fact that the developed countries have not carried out all of their liberalization obligations, yet LDCs are the ones currently under pressure to expedite their liberalisation of their investments and imports from the international financial entities and regional trade facilitators. The paradox of these developments is that the developed countries who propose these policies ask for more time to restructure their textiles and agriculture while the LDCs having been forced to restructure, are told to persevere the pains thereof for a time.For instance, the proscription of investment subsidies and measures makes it very difficult to facilitate the domestic or local industries. This in turn ushers in poverty and then consequently, dependency syndrome. The liberalization of the agric ultural sector is also a setback to small scale farmers since their products become subject to international competition which is characterised by cheaper foreign products ,making incursions into the market. The products from the developed countries are always cheap, following the fact that the dealers in them enjoy huge government subsidies. On the other hand, the developing economies do not have a financial pool, large enough to facilitate the issuance of subsidies to its farmers. This amounts to nothing else but unequal competition ( Tomilson, 1998 pp. 106).WTO TRIPS tolerates very high standards of IPR ( Intellectual Property Rights) type of leadership. This leads to the entrenchment of high prices on medicine, health services and other essential services at the behest of Northern corporation patenting. These Northern corporations deal in biological materials which come from the south and their patenting leads to high costs and at the same time, diminishes the accessibility of i ndustrial technology to developing countries (Trebilcock, 2000 pp. 91).Again, on the 15th May, 2003 WTO TRIPS Meeting that was aimed at implementing policies that were to aid development seemed to lack sincerity and good will. The TRIPS were to engage in the technical support and assistance of   the LDCs. However, even the Secretariat was not accorded with chance to air the key issues as touching on the options of the LDCs. This means that should this plan be carried out, the assistance may not be that which will truly meet the needs of the LDCs (Hoekman, Philip and Mattoo, 1996 pp. 45).The matter of patenting of the pharmaceuticals that have been proposed by the WTO TRIPS is also posing a potential threat to the LDCs. The developed economies know this well and this is why, in liaison with the movers and shakers of these ministerials, are trying to hoodwink the LDCs by exempting them from subscribing to the Sections 7 and 5 fully, citing an extended grace period that stretches to January 2016 (Gamharter, 2004 pp. 69). However, they are quite sure about the accruals that will begin to trickle in on the inception of these sections. This period is not enough for the LDCs to improve their health sectors to match the competition that will be coming from the international medical and health care practitioners. LDCs are likely then to face untold miseries in the public health sectors, taking the form of the inability to provide comprehensive   medicinal services and health acre due to price fluctuation from the international dealers.   The local medical care givers will also face a lot of disillusionment, stemming from competition from the international medical care givers.In the agricultural sector, the TRIPS has also been a let down to the LDCs. This is because, although the LDCs have not yet industrialised, meaning that their economic mainstay is agriculture, yet, Paragraph 11 of the Agricultural Section of the TRIPS only lists down matters pertaining to agr iculture, in relation to the   LDCs development, but does not elaborate further how the issues are to be tackled. This section contains serious matters such as the LDCs being excluded from the exercise of curbing the subsidies, so as to extirpate cases of cheap foreign food products from inundating the local food products and market, the ratification of a market access that is quota free to the LDCs agricultural products (Evenson and Staniello, 2004 pp. 203). This section also was supposed to tackle the issue of LDCs being given the chance to re- evaluate their bound tariff rate to ward off cases of disillusionment of local farmers in the LDCs . Inspite of the seriousness of this provision, it has never been developed or revised for ratification, since it seems that the accruals will now not be trickling so much more to the developed economies (Carvalho, 2002 pp. 97).The local service providers in the developing world have also been left non- viable due to the fact that developing economies have been forced to open up to international market, their service sectors. For instance, it is on this backdrop that national telecommunication corporations in Africa, are closing down following the arrival of the international telephone service providers such as the American originated Vodaphone company, and the European telephone service provider known in Africa as the Celtel (Trendl, 2002 pp. 49)LCDs frustrations stemming from inconsistencies in the running of the WTO programmes.Apart from these glaring facts about the competitive interests of the states, developing countries encounter setbacks in the realisation of its goals due to lack of structural balance and some pitfalls within the WTO. For instance, in 1999 Seattle ministerial and in the 2001 DOHA ministerial, developing economies presented these realities with the intention of making the WTO revoke the pristine stipulations, only for the developed economies to state that developing economies had entered commit ments that were legally binding, and that it is incumbent upon the developing economies to complete their payments first before such matters of abrogation of policies are considered. In the fifth Ministerial which was convened in Singapore, 2003, the LDCs were being prevailed upon to postpone the issues for the new agreements but at the same time, the LDCs were still subject to the many concessions on their side. This does not only betray the lopsidedness of the WTO, but also acts as a pointer to the fact that the developing economies were going to continue being subjected to double payments (Twiggz, 1989 pp. 80). Hitherto, the developed countries had not accrued any anticipated gain from the textile or agricultural concessions.Developing countries are, concerning the issue being told that their proposals that they be   given access to the Northern markets, will only, as a pay package deal, be considered in the post DOHA meeting schedule. However, this was to be on condition that they conform with new WTO issues. It is a fact that the new agreements may not usher in gains since the WTO lacks reciprocity, as is being seen in the international trade imbalance. This is also intimating the fact that even in the face of new agreements, developing countries will still be poised to be shortchanged. Furthermore, there is no clear pointer to the fact that there will be the WTO systems and policy re- evaluation or balancing. Neither is the access to the Northern market by the developed countries, nor the abrogation of these policies going to take place so easily (Wu, 2003 pp. 120).Many developing countries also find themselves receiving difficulties in the form of plummeted prices of commodities and the incapacitation on the side of the developing countries to diversify or to adjust upwards, their exports, due to the limitations on the side of the supplies and the accessibility of the market. This problem also arises out of the imbalances within the trading system of the WTO (Wong, 2002 pp. 75).Even the process by which consensus is reached in the WTO is wanting. The will of the developed countries always seem to inundate that of their counterparts in the developing countries. While it is true that the majority in the WTO comprise the developing economies, yet their unified voices cannot secure their interests against their developed counterparts. When the LDCs presented their objections to the WTO, the developed economies maintained that there was no apparent need for WTO systems and rules being rebalanced. The developed economies being the minority, yet could still prevail upon the WTO panel to have it that the recommendations by the LDCs be reviewed in peace meals. This is the reason why even after several years before and after the DOHA, no re- balancing or review of these inequalities have been carried out. On the contrary, appeals by the developing economies that there be the reviewing of the problems   before the inception of negotiatio ns on new areas were drastically scuttled (Vohra, 2000 pp. 19).Upon these development, the developed countries also arose to exert pressure on the WTO to lengthen its mandate to make rules so as to integrate the new areas that were being opposed by the LDCs, an action which the developing economies countered together with other groupings from other regional blocks (Benson, 1996 pp. 102). Apart from stating their case that they were not set to have new negotiations and/ or to adhere to the subsequent rules, the underdogs stated it clearly that they were not in full knowledge of what the newly proposed issues could portend, in terms of obligations. In addition to the above reasons, the developed economies maintained that the newly proposed agreements would add to their already inundating burdens, more obligations which would continue to further derail their development progress. As a result, the LDCs maintained that these newly proposed agreements be still considered for discussions b ut without being given first hand priority (Burke, 1999 pp. 33) .However, spates of unusual and enigmatic methodologies in WTO decision making, made it possible for the views of the developing countries not to be considered in Geneva DOHA Ministerial Declaration. This state of affairs elicited disgruntlement from the developing countries side since they saw in this, nontransparent and unrepresentative draftings. The LDCs posited that a draft elaborating the differences between the two sides be availed in lieu of the one sided draft which tended to carry some elements of deception that it was drafted on a consensus. Strangely enough, once again, these   proposals were disregarded and the document that favoured the new issues was adapted as the premise of the negotiations. This gave the developed economies an upper hand.At Doha, in the Green Room meeting, only very few countries were allowed in, to act as the representatives of those left out. The process turned out to be unrepresen tative, nontransparent, and not the true representation of their views.Objections arose at the last session at DOHA when the chairperson at the meeting declared that a consensus touching on modalities and the newly proposed agreements was a prerequisite for the negotiations to begin in the next sitting (Chan and Sherman, 2000 pp. 54).The prospects of the post DOHA constructions and how they are likely to affect the LDCs.Experts posit that the talk is to touch on nineteen areas which are broad scaled, touching on politics and economy, as opposed to the Uruguay Round agenda which only touched on economics. The Post DOHA program is said to be heavy since it touches on human resources, time and technical expertise which the developing countries lack. Other issues that are likely to come up are subsidies, electronic commerce, dumping, and the new work program which at the present is said to promote the imbalance between the developed and the developing economies in the WTO.   Instead o f seeking to offset the inconsistency between the two spheres, the WTO has on the contrary, accorded special handling of the high areas of interests to the developed economies and neglecting the high areas of interest to the least developed economies (Shan, 2007 pp. 203). This has translated into situations whereby areas that are considered to portend deep interests are being rushed after by the developed countries while in the mean time the developing economies try to deliberately hinder these areas from being seized by the developed economies. Some of these areas of interest touch on matters such as electronic commerce, matters touching on the environment and employment (Tsuruoka, 1995 pp. 89).More problems are bound to arise since, whereas the the developing countries consider the implementation issues such as the provisions of the balance of payments, textile and agriculture, these matters have not been slotted anywhere in the work programmes main text book. On the other hand, m atters that are considered more important by the developed countries compared to the developing counterparts, matters such as science, technology, and finance are already in the main text book of the main program.Matters such as special and designated treatment are also considered important by the developing countries since this party wants to tackle the issue in the next DOHA ministerial, to instill precision, effectiveness and efficiency. In the main text book of the work program, this matter has not been featured anywhere, meaning that the developing countries will in the meantime continue to be subjected to the whims of those with the upper hand in the WTO. This system of special and designated provision plummet the substantive extent of the obligations that are to be presided over by   the developing economies. It is thus very clear that even the work programs provision, or its running is lopsided and is therefore of no benefit at all to the developing economies. Instead, it is a stepping stone to the developed countries for their beneficence, yet, these countries give nothing to the developing countries (Schuller, 2002 pp. 144). This happens in the face of total contravention to the GATT/ and the WTO Reciprocal Principle since   the process of negotiations amongst all members of the WTO must be guided by the chief principle of reciprocity.The concept of reciprocity according to experts should not be pegged on particular commitments in the agreements, but should also be based upon the designation of items for close attention . Albeit, it must be noted that it is quite paradoxical that the WTO new face started with a promotion of an imbalance. Interestingly enough, this same work program has been at times referred to alternatively as the development plan. It is commonsense that if the development plan itself is faulty, and has also been totally fixed by the top developed countries to suit their own economic interests, given the fact that nothing has b een reflected in it to give priority to the developing countries, then the world should anticipate nothing else but the widening of the gulf between the rich countries and the poor countries ( Chan, 2002 pp. 2002). Not only this, but if the situation is not turned around (for which there is a very slim chance), then capital is likely to continue flowing from the developing countries into the metropoles, making the metropoles richer day by day, while leaving the poor more emaciated upon every actualisation of an international business deal.As touching on the implementation issues, the decisions by Doha has not been very satiating. For instance, it is now a WTO policy that agreements and countervailing policies touching on subsidies in the least developing countries with a Gross National Production (GNP) less than 1,000 US dollar per annum, keep on being included in the sanitary and phytosanitary agreement measures list. It is only upon exceeding this line for three consecutive years that a country will be expunged from this list. On any countrys GDP falling below this mark, the country will automatically be re- included in this list (Chan- Gonzaga, 2001 pp. 121).This portends more problems to the Developing economies since they are the ones who are highly susceptible to fall into these traps, given their small scale economies and hence, low GDP. Although there have been proposals by developing economies that these systems that cause imbalances and give rise to problems be revoked, yet as far as touching on these substantive matters, there has been hardly development made on the issue. It is on this premise that many developing economies will be given no priority in the oncoming post DOHA meetings, since these countries will be falling within this rubric of countries that fall below the mark of 1,000 US dollars per annum. Much to the chagrin of these developing nations, the matters already designated for negotiations (the Singapore issues) are not only very sens itive, but are also posing higher potential of reaching the negotiation status. This makes it harder for the rest of the developing countries, should there be need to reach consensus through   a   plebiscite, which is usually a game of numbers (Das, 1999 pp. 120).Following the stipulations from the Uruguay Round, part of the oncoming designated agenda for the WTO will touch on the negotiation on agriculture. The previous DOHA declaration spells out that in the agricultural negotiations, the principal focus will be working out towards total excision of the export subsidies. This will also include the working towards making governments desist from issuing local support offered to the farmer and the trader, since this local support, they say, distorts international trade. Mostly, this will demand that developed countries be prevailed upon to to revoke the issuance of subsidies (Elchelberger and Allen, 2000 pp. 55). Experts point out that the major developed countries can use these terms to point out that the measures of the domestic support that were included in Annex 2 are not to be subjected to reduction talks. This will lead to the major developed nations being exempt from the reduction injunctions. This will be catastrophic to the farmers and traders in the developing economies since they will not be liable to receiving subsidies while their counterparts in the developed economies will be receiving the subsidies. This brings about unequal competition in the international market yet at the same time, it poses high protectionism in the developed countries. This is an outright application of double standards.The oncoming negotiations will also include the part of services as one of the set- in agenda. This will follow in the wake of the realisation of the fact that the WTO branch, the General Trade on Services, the GATS, is also imbalanced. The developed economies poses far much greater power in the services sector, while the developing countries on the othe r hand, are very feeble in this sense. In addition to this, they are faced with limitations in supply. This leaves the developing economies with the incapacity to fairly compete with the developed countries.;General impact of the WTO stipulations on the LDCsHaving looked at that pitfalls of WTO and its bodies (the DOHA and the TRIPS), it is now incumbent that the consequences of these pitfalls on developing economies be looked at. It is also important to note that some of these implications have already been dealt with.The WTO deals with other nations through the two Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It is these two Bretton Woods institutions that some times make sure that the policies carried out in the WTO to promote the international financial transactions are implemented or carried out by the developing countries. It is to this effect that these institutions are known to carry out draconian measures on developing countries to ensure that these countries ratify the implementations. For instance, the 1990s saw most African countries and other developing countries being denied foreign aid because they were still resisting the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programs. Apart from the fact that this measure stagnated the development process and the financial growth rate, most countries were left paralysed, not being even able to support even the running of the daily domestic economic activities (Guo, 2002 pp. 100).These Structural adjustment programs were in themselves not suitable to the developing economies prospects and programs ( it must be remembered that the Structural Adjustment Programs were the initiatives of the WTO which then was out to bolster international trade). To be more precise, the Structural Adjustment Programs had one of its guidelines being cost sharing. Herein, developing countries were to reduce their debt- to-   revenue ratio by accepting this methodology of cost sharing. This p olicy was being heralded by the developed economies and the two Bretton   Ã‚   Woods Institutions as the panacea that was to extirpate the widespread cases of over reliance on foreign aid (Lewis 2000, pp. 208)In the first case, African countries and their developing counterparts were told that they were spending too much on their educational programmes.   To turn around the situation, these countries were supposed to withdraw permanently, the custom of issuing allowances to students. In addition to this, access to educational loans was to be plummeted, meaning that only students with high outstanding performance were to access these loans. The governments in the developing countries, and especially Africa, were to invent ways of making money from the educational sector, and for this, the Module Two Programs emerged. These Module Two Programmes, otherwise known as Parallel Programmes run autonomously from the government funded, or subsidised conventional university programs (Hu, 2001 pp. 255).These measures on the educational programs have lead to massive cases in the developing economies not being able to expand their educational programmes, to match the rising educational demand that stems from the growing population. As a result, many students who merit going to the university miss securing admission. In addition to this, the Parallel programmes are too expensive for the ordinary citizens in the developing countries to afford.In a nutshell, this measure of cost sharing in the educational sector only succeeded in making education in the developing countries inaccessible, and thus making these countries susceptible to massive cases of brain drain. For the first time, in the 1994, four years after the inception of the Structural Adjustment Programmes, there were cases of university students being dismissed from universities due to fee arrears in the eastern Africa region. At the same time, those students with good grades and a fair financial pool who fail t o make it to the government subsidised programmes opt for oversees studies in the developed countries. Upon completion, these students prefer to work in these developing countries. This massive cases of transnational exodus for greener pastures has left the developing countries more and more subjected to brain drain and lack of skilled labour (Kang, and Feng, 2002 pp. 107).Still on the concept of cost sharing, the governments in the developing countries were prevailed upon by the two Bretton Woods Institutions to reduce their expenditures by carrying out a massive exercise of downsizing the civil service so as to trim its size. These exercises were to be carried out starting from 1995- 2005 in most African economies for example. In Latin America, the measure was to be carried out in phases starting from 1992- 2002. However, contrary to what developing countries were told, the carrying out of this exercise only proved to be a Pandora box, ushering in untold catalogues of untold miser y at the hands of poverty. Simply put, the myriad numbers of the retrenched civil servants found themselves subject to poverty ( Low, 1997 pp. 124).In the same spectrum, the concept of international trade which was formed by the WTO and heralded by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that nations cede away the production of certain products to other countries with specialisation ( both natural and human resources, together with technological endowment), does not ager well with the developing nations. Developing nations are kept from realising their dreams of indutrialisation through this concept. Moreover, the concept itself is innately twisted since a nation can be having adequate natural resources and man power, but can be a fledgeling economy that has not yet fine tuned its technological advancement with its indutrialisation programmes (Lyon, 1996 pp. 51). More importantly, the exercise translates into more problems since it leads to more cases of jobs being forfei ted, especially in the developing economies, since developing economies have not yet fully been industrialised. This strain of international outsourcing coupled together with its twin, the downsizing of the civil service, has increased the level of unemployment in the developing sector. The problem proves to be hydra headed since the potential tertiary education students who miss out on learning opportunities together with the retrenched civil servants, add to the bulk of the unemployed population with no means of livelihood. It is on this backdrop that all the developing economies have national security matters making it to the top five national agenda in the annual review of national programmes (Shrybman, 2001 pp. 67).World trade, an undertaking which the WTO Is chiefly interested in, is in itself also bedeviled by many issues that touch on the entrenchment of political, cultural and economic domination of the developing countries by their global trading counterparts, the develope d countries. For instance, although the developed countries form the minority in the WTO DOHA, yet their will is highly predominant over the developing countries (Wong and Mc Ginty, 2002, pp. 40). In addition to this, the same institutions that are used to channel foreign funds to the developing economies, the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Funds (IMF), belong to the developed economies. In addition to being the conduit through which foreign fundings reach other countries, these two Bretton Woods Institutions are supposed to offer advisory services, and at the same time, carry out investigative and monitoring activities on the developing economies progress (Mah, 1998 pp. 120). In the course of the monitoring progress,   the developing economies are supposed to submit their statements of accounts to either the WB or the IMF. This exposes easily, the   developing countries to political manipulation by the developed countries, especially those in the west (Markel, 2 000 pp. 43).It is also through the WTOs international outsourcing that different multinational corporations have been able to make incursions